

The interactive constitution of interculturality: How to be a Japanese with words*

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Abstract. This paper starts with questioning the “traditional” approach to the so-called intercultural communication. Most students of intercultural communication, it seems, use the categories characterising a cultural or ethnic identity, such as ‘Western’, ‘Indian’, ‘European’, ‘Aboriginal’ and the like, as parameters by reference to which some distinctive phenomena observed in conversational materials should be explained. Even though they may apply these categories correctly, they do not take into account the relevancy of these categories in each interaction.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that being a Japanese is achieved interactively and that “interculturality” of intercultural communication is constituted in and through the actual course of the interaction. In the analysis of interviews conducted with foreign students in Japan, it can be seen that the interviewer and the interviewee had to keep on coordinating their conduct throughout the development of their interaction in order that they could be a Japanese and a foreigner relevantly. In this way, what, in the studies of intercultural communication, is presupposed to be simply given, that is, the fact of a person being a Japanese or the like, is shown to be analysable and investigable as an interactive phenomenon in its own right.

The appeal to national character is generally a mere
confession of ignorance . . .
— Max Weber

1. Interculturality as a phenomenon to be investigated in its own right

One kind of communication between two or more people is called “intercultural.” For sociologists or anthropologists it is a type of communication in which participants have culturally different backgrounds. However, the fact that the participants are “culturally different” is usually taken for granted, as it is treated as a parameter rather than a topic of investigation.

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The “interculturality” of the participants tends to be referred to as an independent variable with which to explain the observable features of the communication in question.

There are some illuminating studies in intercultural communication. For example, J. J. Gumperz (1982: Ch. 5) observes that when “Indian” and “Western” students have a discussion in an anthropology class, “Western” students tend more often to start talking before “Indian” students finish (i.e., the “Western” tend more often to interrupt the “Indian”) than the other way around. He attributes this observation to the fact that the intonation of “Indian” students’ speech, because their English is influenced by Hindi, is different from that of “Western” ones. The intonation “Indian” students use to punctuate an utterance in its course is very similar to what “Western” students use at the end of their talk. Another example is K. Liberman’s (1985; 1990) studies of communication between Aborigines and Europeans in Australia. He reports that Aborigines tend to put themselves into a disadvantageous position in a classroom or in court, because their way of conversation is quite different from that of Europeans. Aborigines usually avoid asserting themselves and try gradually to produce agreement by repeating the same phrases together, so that, even when cross-examined in court, they tend just to say, “yes,” in order to let conversation go smoothly, rather than answering the question. Aborigine children, when asked to voice their opinions in a classroom, tend to be hesitant to speak out, avoiding self-assertion, so that a European teacher may consider them to lack understanding.

F. Erickson and J. Shulz (1982) follow a similar procedure. They find “that *situationally emergent* rather than *normatively fixed* social identity had the strongest influence on the character and outcome of interview” (p. 181, emphasis in original). They reach this conclusion by identifying the troubles ethnically different participants get into, with differences between communicative patterns of different ethnic groups, and then proceeding to argue that “If a student is ethnically different from the counselor and wants special help and friendliness, he or she must *make up for* ethnic differences by establishing some other form of co-membership. For example, if a student is Polish-American and the counselor is Italian-American, it helps if they both happen to be wrestlers and reveal themselves as such” (p. 176, emphasis added).

I would not deny that studies like these are valuable from various points of view. However, what I want to do is to show how it is that *the fact of being* intercultural is organized as a social phenomenon. In the following, I want to treat this as a phenomenon to be investigated, instead of using interculturality – the fact that the participants come from different cultures – as a given fact from which the argument should start.

In the studies just mentioned, it is the authors, and *not the participants themselves*, that attribute cultural differences to the participants. The authors

explain the features of the communication by reference to behavioral patterns, independently identified from an outside observer's perspective. The participants themselves must be ignorant of these patterns, for otherwise they could manage to do away with troubles they come across. These explanations are really good sociological ones in the usual sense. The authors explain what they observe by means of hypothetical devices independently constructed for just that purpose. This cannot but remind me of a complaint Harvey Sacks made about the procedures of traditional sociology: It has not dealt with "real phenomena." In order to approach such "real phenomena," I want to show how it is that interculturality – cultural differences between the participants – is relevant to or in the very communication that can be called "intercultural." I also intend to show how it is that this relevance of interculturality is relevantly consequential for some observable features of the communication in question.¹

Some "traditional" sociologists might say that the real social phenomena really worth investigating lie beyond immediate interaction; each interaction, or communicative situation, they would say, cannot but be influenced by those structural features related to such attributes as "Japanese," "Sri Lankan," "male," "female," etc., which are hidden behind that interaction itself and outside its relevances. However, I would say, if so, the question should be rather: How do we, not only as professional sociologists but also as "well-informed" citizens, get a sense of hidden structure, although it is hidden? I will not answer this question directly, but I believe that the answer, whatever it may be, must be searched for in the talk-in-interaction.²

In the following, I wish to show that what is assumed to be simply a given fact and used as an explanation for some observed phenomena can be an interactive phenomenon to be investigated in its own right. The fact of being culturally different is also an achievement in and through talk-in-interaction.

2. 'Japanese' and 'Foreigners'

The materials I will analyze in the following are transcribed fragments of radio program interviews conducted with "foreign students"³ in Japan. I will present only their English translation in the text, to avoid unnecessary complexity (the original transcript is found in the Appendix at the end of the paper. The materials are not necessarily translated in natural English, because the translation is just a supplementary means by which to show how I analyze the original Japanese materials; the translation is not in any sense the materials I analyze). I want to show, first, how it is that the cultural difference between the participants is made relevant to the interaction they par-

ticipate in, through and as an arrangement of their linguistic, and other vocal, conduct. (A is the interviewer; B the interviewee.)

(1) (9/23/ 1992: 115)

- 1 A: One thing I want to ask you is: when Japanese people talk in
2 Japanese, they are sometimes only diplomatic,
3 B: Yes.
4 A: [they] are just apparently sociable,
5 B: Yes.
6 A: [they] are sometimes so, aren't //[they]?
7 B: Yes.
8 A: For example, "Well, Shiri-san, come to my home uh next holiday,"
9 say [they] very easily.
10 B: Yes.
11 A: If you actually go there on the next holiday, [they] will say, "Oh?
12 For what have you come here," ma(h)//y(h)be(h). //.hhhh
13 B: hhhhhhhhhhhh
13a Yes.
14 A: I mean, what [they] say and
15 B: Yes.
16 A: what [they] mean seem different,
17 B: Yes
18 A: this way Japanese often
19 B: Yes.
20 A: talk, //don't [they]. [they] often talk so.
21 B: Yes.
21a Yes.
22 A: How about this.
23 B: This is a little troublesome to foreigners, //[they] th-
24 A: It's troublesome, isn't it.
25 B: Yes, wrongly, [they] will take what is said for what is meant,
26 everyone thinks so, //I think.
27 A: That's exactly what I was thinking.
28 B: Yes.
29 A: U:::n, but in case Japanese talk among themselves,
30 B: Yes.
31 A: "That must be just diplomatic," an//d
32 B: Uh h//uh
33 A: "This must be different from what is meant," - this way [they]
34 understand what's meant, //you know
35 B: Yes.
36 A: Uh, without any special effort.
37 B: Yes.
38 A: It's exactly this "without any special effort" that is troublesome, isn't
39 it.
40 B: Ye(hhhhh)s, that's a little, uh troublesome.=not a little: but u:://h
41 A: u(hhhhhhhh)h ve(h)ry(h) trou(h)ble(h)//so(h)me(h)
42 B: troublesome.

The interviewer does not introduce himself as a Japanese, nor is he called a Japanese by the interviewee. In this interview, however, he is neither more nor less than a Japanese. Indeed, when listening to the (tape recorded) interview, not only do I have no doubt that he is a Japanese, but also his Japanese-ness is constitutive for my activity of listening to, and understanding, the interview. The interviewer is relevantly a Japanese in and to that interview (i.e., both for the participants and for an overhearing analyst), even though independent of the correctness of his being a Japanese. This Japanese-ness consists in the way in which the interaction between the participants goes on in the interview; i.e., it is interactively constituted.

Harvey Sacks may have been the first sociologist to pay serious attention to the distinction between the "correctness" and the "relevance" of applications of categories (see Schegloff, 1972). For instance, that I am a Japanese is correct, but the category "Japanese" is not always relevantly applicable to me; whether I am a Japanese or not might be irrelevant when I talk to students about Structural-Functionalism in a sociology class. One of the most important implications of what Sacks (1972a, 1972b etc.) says about the relevance of categories is that when one relevantly uses a category this makes a *collection* of categories relevant. For example, if you apply the category "fathers" to someone, it is relevant to use "mother" to refer to another one insofar as she is the mother in the family in which the former person is the father. Using the category "father" makes relevant the category collection "family." Some categories belong to more than one collection. For example, the category "children" is a member of the collections "family" as well as "stages of life."

Another important implication of Sacks' argument is that within each collection there are some normatively expected relationships between its categories. Sacks observes that some activities are bound to categories; e.g., babies will cry, Japanese university students will play a lot, etc. Such category-bound activities are often, expectedly, directed to other categories of the same collection to which the category those activities are bound to belong; e.g., a mother or father will pick up their baby when it cries.⁴ As to this, I happened to find a nice example in the (very) American film, *The Sound of Music*. A nun, called Maria, came to a captain's house as a private tutor of his children, to find the strictly disciplined children in uniform. One day, when her request to give them play suits was refused by the captain, she said to him, "But they are children." Then he says in response, "Yes, I *am* their father." The category "children" used by Maria belongs to the collection "stages of life." The category now relevantly applicable to Maria and the one to the captain are both "adult." Accordingly, the normative expectation is invoked that adults should be lenient towards children. On the other hand, the captain treats the category "children" as a member of the collection "fam-

ily." By referring to himself as "father," he has made the collection "family" relevant, instead of "stages of life." Exploiting the fact that the category "children" happens to belong to two collections, he deprived Maria of the legitimate position she could otherwise have held in relation to the children; she does not have any position in their "family." That is to say, now Maria is an "outsider" or "stranger" rather than "adult" to them. The expectation invoked by his utterance is that outsiders or strangers should not have any rights to the family affairs, while the father has the right and obligation to take care of his children; he is saying to her, "That's none of your business."

In the above material A (the interviewer) often uses the category "*nihonjin* (Japanese)," although not referring to himself with this category. He speaks only generally of Japan and the Japanese people. Nevertheless, as I said, he is relevantly a Japanese. How?

It is true that the category "Japanese" is a member of the collection "nationalities," to which "Sri Lankan" "French" "American" etc. also belong. We notice, however, that B uses the category "*gaikokujin* (foreigner)," although, again, he speaks only generally with this category, not referring to himself. That is, the category "Japanese" used by A is not a member of "nationalities" but rather of the pair "'Japanese' / 'foreigner (non-Japanese)'" "Japanese" is not just a member of a collection whose members stand side by side, but rather, together with "foreigner," co-constitutes a pair whose members are contrasted to one another and related asymmetrically. Indeed, in the above material, we see that "Japanese" and "foreigner" are contrasted, such that what the Japanese understand easily "without any effort" (36) is "troublesome" (40) to the "foreigner" or the non-Japanese precisely because of its easiness for the Japanese. Generally speaking, cultural differences are a matter of relativity. For example, depending upon what criteria are to be used, the Sri Lankans and the Japanese may not be any more culturally different than Bostonians and New Yorkers are, and those living in Boston and those living in Cambridge may be as culturally different as the Sri Lankans and the Japanese. The Sri Lankans are only culturally different from the Japanese through being "foreigners" or the non-Japanese. It is the pair "'Japanese' / 'foreigner'" that makes "interculturality" relevant to and in the interaction in which those categories are used.

The categories "Japanese" and "foreigner" are mutually exclusive; i.e., the one and same person cannot be a Japanese and foreigner (in Japan) at the same time. This has a consequence for the normatively expected relationships between the Japanese and foreigners. Although A has not referred to himself, nor has he been referred to by B, as a Japanese, while B was introduced as a Sri Lankan by A at the beginning of the program, A is *relevantly* a Japanese by locating himself in a relationship of this kind with B. It is normatively expected that the Japanese should be more entitled to report

anything “usual” and “ordinary” in Japan than foreigners, and that foreigners should be more entitled to report any troubles that result from unfamiliarity with Japan than the Japanese. This does not mean that the Japanese *really* know what is usual and ordinary in Japan better than foreigners, nor that foreigners *really* know what troubles the non-Japanese may encounter better than the Japanese. Indeed, many non-Japanese know about what the Japanese usually and ordinarily do much more than do many Japanese. There is even no guarantee that the interviewer (A) knows about such things more than the interviewee (B). In fact, I am very doubtful that what A says about the Japanese people is true, and I believe that there are other peoples much more diplomatic than the Japanese.

The point is that it is normatively *expected* that the relative entitlements should be systematically distributed between the Japanese and foreigners. Indeed, the expectation of this systematic distribution of entitlements is observably embodied in the interaction in question. A introduces what the Japanese people usually do without any trouble (1 through 20), and as to troubles resulting from unfamiliarity with this, he asks B for confirmation (29 through 39). For his part, B answers A’s question on behalf of the foreigner (23 through 26 and 40 through 42). Thus, I want to argue, “interculturality” or a cultural difference is accomplished, as relevant to and in the interaction, through its participants putting themselves in a relationship normatively expected to obtain between incumbents of the categories “Japanese” and “foreigner,” using this category pair in that interaction.

3. Interactive constitution of interculturality

In the preceding section, I tried to show that what makes the interaction relevantly intercultural is neither those features outside the interaction that are observed by the observer in reference to attributes selected by him or her, nor what each participant thinks about themselves behind the interaction (i.e., inside their heads); rather, it is a form of exchange in the interaction itself. As matter of fact, the above fragment is located in a dramatic context, looking at which will help show the point more clearly.

Note that the above fragment starts with the phrase uttered by the interviewer (A) “*Hitotsu ukagaitainowa ne* (One thing I want to ask you is).” This phrase acts as a preface to a question that the speaker has wanted to ask but has not found any chance to ask until now, and it implies that this is the first time in this interaction to ask such a question. If he had asked another such question at an earlier point sufficiently close to here, it would be natural to say, “*Moohitotsu ukagaitainowa* (Another thing I want to ask you)” or “*Tsugini ukagaitainowa* (A second thing I want to ask you).” However, we find the following fragment immediately before the above one.

(2) (9/23/ 1992: 107)

- 1 A: Well, what I definitely want to ask is:
 2 B: Yes.
 3 A: u::h Studying Japanese, alright?
 4 B: Yes.
 5 A: and speaking to Japanese people, //alright?
 6 B: Yes.
 7 A: then, sometimes don't you find what they are saying difficult to
 8 understand? //I wonder.
 9 B: Yes, I do.
 10 B: Yes, I do. Sure, I do.
 11 A: Yes.
 12 B: That is, in my company I work for, and I work //now.
 13 A: Yes, yes.
 14 B: In that company, that is a construction company,
 15 A: =Yes.
 16 B: there are used many technical words.
 17 A: =O, technical terms. //(), right?
 18 B: Technical terms ()
 19 B: Then, I come across a non-understandable [for me] wo- thing,
 19a // sometimes.
 20 A: U:::.....h
 21 A: Yes.
 22 B: Not just sometimes, but r//:- r//:-
 23 A: m:: m::
 24 B: m::
 25 ?: hhhhhhhh
 26 A: so(h)me(h)ti(h)mes(h), you(h) do(h).
 27 B: Yes
 28 A: But anyway you couldn't avoid it. To learn them one by one is the
 29 only way, //I think, //yeah.
 30 B: Yes. Yes.
 31 A: One thing I want to ask you is: ...

The very last utterance is the first one of fragment (1). We notice that the phrase is very similar to the first one in this fragment (2), which is *also* a preface to a question that the speaker has wanted to ask but has not had a chance to ask until now. Taken literally, the utterance at 1 in (2) contradicts the implication of the first one in fragment (1) (i.e., the last one in (2)), because it turns out that the question prefaced by the first utterance in (1) (i.e., the last one in (2)) may not be the first question of this kind (i.e., an askable-but-not-yet-asked question). Then, to dissolve this apparent contradiction, those questions prefaced by both of the prefatory utterances, the first in (2) and the first in (1), should be considered the same one. Indeed, the question at the start of fragment (1) can be regarded as a reiteration of the one at the start of (2), because its content can be heard to be just more specific. In fragment (1), A refers not just to the Japanese language, as in (2), but

the Japanese mode of linguistic behavior. He appears to be reiterating the preceding question by repairing, or clarifying, it (see Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977). Certainly, the fact that A is trying to repair his former question seems to be concealed in a subtle fashion; he seems to keep the talk on the topic occasioned by his question until its possible termination point, without interrupting it by saying something like: "Excuse me, I mean..." However, what is important here is the *fact* of the repair. What is its consequential significance?

In fragment (2), the interviewer (A) also uses the category "Japanese" in his question, but this category does not become relevant to this part of the interaction. B mentions "technical terms" or "technical words" in answering the question. The category collection which can be made relevant by the phrase "technical terms" is not "'Japanese' / 'foreigner'," but rather "'specialist' / 'lay person'"; and a normatively expected relationship bound to this collection is that the "specialist" should be more entitled to talk about technical terms than "lay persons." If so, then in our case, it is not A, who is a "Japanese," but B, who works for a "construction company," who should be more entitled to talk about technical (even though Japanese) terms. This expected relationship goes against the one bound to the collection "'Japanese' / 'foreigner'." Indeed, at lines 28 and 29, A makes only an unspecified, general comment about difficulties of (Japanese) technical terms, without going into details. Although, as the title of the program suggests, A and B might have been arranged to be relevantly a Japanese and a foreigner beforehand, they cannot necessarily keep being so successfully throughout the interaction. Their being a Japanese and a foreigner successfully is contingent on the actual development of the interaction.

The same uncertainty of communication being successfully intercultural can be seen in the following fragment, which is taken from another interview of the program series. (Again, A is the interviewer and B the interviewee.) (3) (9/24/1992: 379)

- 1 B: ... U::h for example, in Japanese- Japanese history,
 2 A: Yes.
 3 B: mountains are important. Import- mountain
 4 A: Mountains.
 5 B: Uh
 6 A: Yes.
 7 B: .hh But .hh in this respect, in Tokyo, about mountains, uh like
 8 Mt. Takao () u//::
 9 A: Mt.(h) Takao(h) is the only one, //isn't it, in the neighborhood.
 10 B: Yes.
 11 B: .hh only few, so //()
 12 A: m
 13 B: in the Kansai area
 14 A: m

- 15 B: uh natural verdure and //then rivers a::nd mountains a//nd
 16 A: m::n
 16a ri:ght, //ri:ght
 17 B: Yes. .hhh b- //boundary ()
 18 A: In Kyoto, like Mt. Arashi and //that Katsura river,
 19 B: Yes
 20 A: .hhh a lot of rivers and mountains and nature //are there, //aren't there.
 21 B: .hhhhhhhhh
 21a Yes, this makes:: (.) .hhh boundary, the notion of boundary
 22 very //c- cl//ear.
 23 A: U::::
 23a yes, yes, yes, o:::::h I see:::::

Before this fragment, B cites the Kansai area as the one most interesting of those he has visited in Japan. When B mentions mountains at line 3 and names Mt. Takao at 8, A says that there are only few mountains around Tokyo at 9. Then, B, agreeing with A, mentions “natural verdure and then rivers and mountains” (15) in the Kansai area (i.e., the Midwestern area in Japan; Tokyo is in the Eastern area). In response to this, A, citing proper names (Mt. Arashi and the Katsura river), says at 20 that Kyoto (an ancient city located in the Kansai) is very natural, as compared with Tokyo. So far, “mountains” and “rivers,” along with “natural verdure” and even “nature” itself, appear to be members of the category collection “nature.” Nature in Japan can be a topic that the “Japanese” are normatively expected to be more entitled to talk about than “foreigners”; indeed, A can be heard to make such a claim by displaying his ability to go into details about nature in Japan, citing proper names at line 18. Again, it is not relevant to this point whether what A says is true and whether the Japanese people *really* have a better knowledge about nature in Japan than foreigners. In any event, thus far, the collection “‘Japanese’ / ‘foreigner’” could be relevant in and to the interaction.

It turns out, however, that “mountains” and “rivers” mentioned by B are members of the collection “*sakai* (boundary),” not “nature” (21a and 22); what B has been saying is that Kyoto has a lot of nature, and that therefore it has also a lot of mountains and rivers, which used to be used as boundaries. At the very beginning of the program, B was introduced by the interviewer as a French student of Japanese history. Now it is obvious that when he starts with saying, “In Japanese history mountains are important,” he is explaining the importance of mountains and rivers as boundaries in Japanese history. If so, “boundary” mentioned by B can be a topic that again makes the collection “‘specialist (in Japanese history)’ / ‘lay person’” relevant, instead of “‘Japanese’ / ‘foreigner’”; and it is B who can be an incumbent of the category “specialist” and can be more entitled to talk of that topic. This again contradicts the normative expectation bound to the collection “‘Japanese’ / ‘foreigner’.”⁵ When A understands that B is talking about boundaries, not

nature, he marks that he has discovered something in B's talk (23a), uttering, "A, *sooka* (Oh I see)," especially using the so-called discovery marker ("A (oh)"). It is not clear *what* he has actually discovered, nor even what he is *claiming* he has discovered. However, what is obvious is that claiming that he now has something new, whatever it may be, he succeeds in bringing the topic to close, without any efforts to develop it. After the claim of a discovery, he introduces another topic (see Note 5). Of course, A *may* know something about the significance of boundaries in Japanese history and he *may* be even less knowledgeable about nature, especially natural geography, in Kyoto than B. However, the point is the *fact* that he goes into some details about the latter by citing proper names, while he does not do this about the former.

So far I have argued that interculturality is organized in and through an actual development of interaction. It may be noted that, after A asks a repaired question in fragment (1), immediately following B's answer, i.e., "This is a little troublesome to foreigners" (23), A repeats that part of B's utterance, which makes prominent the contrast involved in the pair "'Japanese' / 'foreigner'," i.e., "troublesome" (24). What each participant is thinking inside his "head", that, for example, he has a special feeling of being a Japanese or foreigner, that he is strongly conscious of his being a Japanese or foreigner, that he wants to be just like a Japanese or foreigner – all this is completely irrelevant to the *fact* of being a Japanese or foreigner. This fact is interactively achieved through and as a sequential arrangement of the participants' (vocal) conduct. It is social in the strongest sense of the word.

4. Ownership of the Japanese language

In this section, I want to show that the ownership⁶ of the Japanese language is embodied in a form the interaction takes in its actual course, and that through this, we can perceive the interaction to be one between a "Japanese" and a "foreigner." What is here meant by the ownership of the Japanese language is, again, a normatively expected relationship between the Japanese people and foreigners, or a normatively expected distribution of entitlements. That is not (just) to say that the Japanese are generally expected to speak and understand Japanese better than foreigners. As matter of fact, it is the case that some non-Japanese people speak Japanese better (grammatically more properly; with a more refined vocabulary etc.) than the average Japanese. The fact that they really speak Japanese better than many Japanese people, however, does not let them have, or share, that expected ownership of the language. The ownership of the language is the normative expectation that the Japanese should be able not only to understand better, but to evaluate the understandability of the Japanese language used by the non-Japanese, and

that they should be entitled to give advice about how to speak Japanese, appraise a foreigner's Japanese and so on. For example, it would sound unnatural, although not impossible and maybe even reasonable, if a non-Japanese whose mother tongue is not Japanese but who speaks Japanese at least as fluently as a native Japanese, were to say to the latter, "You speak Japanese very well." On the contrary, however poor a speaker a native might be, he or she should be able to use the compliment when speaking with the non-Japanese (at least more) naturally. Note that I am not saying that only the Japanese have the exclusive right to use the Japanese language in an authentic way. The ownership of the language is a normative expectation, which is used by the participants as a resource for organizing their interaction.

What I want to emphasize here is a prominent pattern observable in the materials. That is, the interviewer (A) often starts to talk before the interviewee (B) finishes. For example:

(4) (9/24/ 1992: 352)

- 1 A: ..what is the most impressive to you.
 2 B: .hh uh it's the Kan(h)sai(h), I think.
 3 A: Huh?
 4 B: Of the Kansai, u:://::m Kyoto=
 5 A: the Kansai,
 6 A: =Kyoto.
 7 B: Kyoto //and Nara:::..... .hhhh
 8 A: What is the most interesting in Kyoto.

At lines 5 and 8, A's voice overlaps B's, not just starting before B's sentences are finished. Is he interrupting B? Is this an expression of his arrogance and rudeness, or his friendliness? I am not here interested in answering these questions. What I want to do here is to show what expected relationship is embodied in a form of interaction, even if it may be the case that one participant is arrogant or rude to the other. Fragment (4) is a fairly complicated one. To see what is happening in it, it will help to examine some other fragments.

(5) (9/23/ 1992: 100)

- 1 B: . . . [I] talked to those people, and //then, when anything I couldn't
 2 A: Right, right.
 3 B: understand, learned from them,
 4 A: Yes.
 5 B: This way, urn like rapidly? //like one by one?
 6 A: U:::h hu:::: O:::h I see:::://:::
 7 B: um I have come to be able to understand many things.

(6) (9/23/ 1992: part of (2))

- 16 B: there are used many technical words.
 17 A: =O, technical terms. //(), right?
 18 B: Technical terms ()
 19 B: Then, I come across a non-understandable wo- thing (.) //sometimes.
 20 A: U:::.....h Yes.

(7) (9/24/1992: 223)

- 1 A: Then, when for the first time in France you heard and learned of
 2 Japanese Shintoism, Buddhism or culture,
 3 B: Ye//s
 4 A: how did you feel?
 5 B: .hhhhhh Ye::hhah, m:: .hhhh //uh
 6 A: "In more detail,
 7 B: Uh, in mo//re-
 8 A: I feel like study//ing::"
 9 B: Yes, so:: //so did I feel.
 10 A: U:::h hu:::h, then at last you came to Japan u(hhhhhhhh)h, I see(h)

A's last utterances of these fragments (6 in (5), 20 in (6), 10 in (7)), which all overlapped B's preceding utterance, include a grasp claim. Saying "I see" or "Uh huh" in an exaggerated mode, A claims that the point of each utterance of B's has been grasped. Generally, such an expression is also used to claim that the utterer of it understands what the co-participant has just said. In particular, in the environment like those observable in fragments (5) through (7), the claim of an understanding of the preceding talk is enhanced in a significant way. In all the above fragments, immediately prior to the markers in question, there are slight perturbations on B's side. In (5), not only is the expression, "*-mitai* (like)," unnatural in Japanese together with "*dondon* (rapidly)." Because of its upward intonation contour, it even sounds like an invitation to A to check what he has just said. In (6), B cuts off a word he has started and replaces another one ("wo- thing. . ."). In addition, just before that, A corrects B's phrase "*senmonno kotoba* (technical words)" (17) and B accepted the correction "*senmon yoogo* (technical terms)" (18). In (7), not only is a perturbation observable at line 5, but also after that, A answers his own question on B's behalf. Grasp claims put in the troublesome environment may suggest, not simply an understanding of what has been said, but rather, "I know you are getting in trouble, but don't worry; that doesn't matter, I understand." This suggestion is related to the evaluation, and acceptance, of the understandability of the utterance just made by the co-participant and the latter's ability to use the language. Such a suggestion should be supposed to be made by those who own the language, when the participants' languages are different. (Note that this suggestion exempts the speaker of the original utterance from responsibility for the possible misunderstanding,

which, in turn, implies that the speaker *could* be responsible for it; the usual claims of understanding may imply the responsibility on the hearer's side.) Thus, in those troublesome environments, insofar as A presumes the expected entitlement to evaluate the understandability of B's utterances, it should be appropriate for A to propose as soon as possible that B's utterances are understandable, even if A's utterance ends up overlapping B's (here, too, it is irrelevant whether A does *really* understand them). Otherwise B's ability might be dubious, which could be in turn another (more serious) obstacle to the current interaction. That is to say, in those environments it should be preferred that A's voice overlap with B's rather than that he delay proposing B's understandability.

The same thing can be said about the last part of fragment (1):

(8) (9/23/1992: last part of (1))

- 38 A: It's exactly this "without any special effort" that is troublesome, isn't
39 it.
40 B: Ye(hhhhh)s, that's a little, uh troublesome.=not a little: but u::://:
41 A: u(hhhhhhhh)h ve(h)ry(h) trou(h)ble(h)//so(h)me(h)
42 B: troublesome.

Here, just after an noticeable perturbation ("u:::") on B's side, A comes in to fill out the slot which has been opened by B's utterance, "*chottoja nakute* (not a little but)," responding to B's laughing voice with his own, upgraded one. In this way, he demonstrates that the point of B's utterance can be grasped even though this has not been completed, and, with his upgraded laughing voice, he seems to propose that B's utterance is understandable and that therefore B has the sufficient ability for the Japanese language.

Now we can see what happens in fragment (4). In response to B's answer at 2 to his first question, A asks B to clarify by saying "Huh?" This clarification request is not necessarily clear at this point; it may be directed to the propriety of B's utterance at 2 as an answer to A's first question, or it may have something to do with problems in A's listening. If the propriety of B's answer is questioned, it means that B's ability to speak Japanese may be dubious. That is, in this case, "Huh?" constitutes a possible troublesome *environment* in the sense that it *may* unsettle a basis of the communication. If so, it is appropriate for A to get rid of the possible suspicion about B's ability, insofar as A is expected to be in a relationship to B which is bound to the ownership of the language. Indeed, after B repeats "the Kansai," which is part of the original answer, A immediately repeats the same word again. A treats B's repetition of the word as a possible proper answer to his "Huh?", and through this, he makes observable that his "Huh?" was directed to some unhearable part of B's utterance; A makes it clear now that the problem he detected in B's first answer is not about the propriety of that answer, but

about a word that was unclear. Here, again, insofar as he has the expected entitlement to approve the understandability of B's utterances and B's linguistic ability, it should be appropriate for him to do away with any possible suspicion about B's ability as soon as possible, so that A's utterance ends up overlapping B's.

Note that the possibility of "Huh?" being directed to the impropriety of B's answer is not arbitrary. In his first question A says not "*doko* (where)" but "*nani* (what)"; moreover, just before this fragment B mentioned three ancient cities he visited, of which two are in the Kansai area, and A's question seems to be based on this. He can be heard to ask, "what is the most impressive in those cities?" However, B answered this question by citing a place name. What A is doing at lines 5 through 8 to prevent this possible impropriety of B's first answer is to treat that answer as a preparatory section for answering A's first question. In other words, A treats B's mentioning the Kansai as though it further specifies the area where B found the most impressive thing. Just when the area is even further specified as Kyoto, A asks B a modified version of the first question, using the phrase, "in Kyoto." That is to say, by treating B's first answer as a further specification of the area, i.e., a preparatory work for answering the question, instead of treating it as the answer itself, A shows that he accepted B's utterance as a properly understandable one. Here, again, insofar as A is expected to dispose of the problem about B's ability, he is supposed to do it as soon as possible, at least soon enough to prevent B from possibly going so far as to finish an inappropriate answer, and, again, his modified question ends up overlapping B's preceding utterance.⁷

In this section, I have shown that interaction takes a particular form as a consequence of the embodiment in it of an expected relationship between the participants, i.e., a relationship bound to the ownership of the language, and therefore bound to the category pair, "'Japanese' / 'foreigner'." In other words, one party's claim for the ownership of Japanese in relation to the other is ratified through and as a form of interaction. That is, it is ratified through its being consequential for formal features of the interaction without being denied or canceled in the natural course of the interaction (and even through the fact that the interaction in which it is embodied was broadcast without being checked).⁸ This may seem tautological, but this seeming tautology is not any problem insofar as I am not engaged in any sociological explanations in the traditional sense. The expected relationship is ratified through a form the interaction takes in its actual course, while the form of the interaction is a consequence of this ratified relationship. That is to say, being relevantly a Japanese or a foreigner is constituted and reproduced in and through the actual course of the interaction.

Notes

1. I am going to follow the program E. A. Schegloff (1991) proposes for dealing with what he calls "talk-in-interaction." He points out two problems to take into consideration when analyzing the data of talk-in-interaction: "There is ... the problem of showing from the details of the talk or other conduct in the materials that we are analyzing that those aspects of the scene [on which we are focusing] are what the parties are oriented to. For that is to show how the parties are embodying for one another the relevancies of the interaction and are thereby producing the social structure" (p. 51). And: "... there remains another problem, that is to show the context or the setting (the local social structure), in that aspect, is procedurally consequential to the talk. How does the fact that the talk is being conducted in some setting (say, 'the hospital') issue in any consequences for the shape, form, trajectory, content, or character of the interaction that the parties conduct? And what is the mechanism by which the context-so-understood has determinate consequences for the talk?" (pp. 52–53) See also Schegloff (1987: 215).
2. With the later Wittgenstein, I doubt the assumption that there is always something essential, hidden behind appearances. Wittgenstein (1953) says: "The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background – hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium); for I understand the propositional sign, I use it to say something" (§102). "If it is asked: 'How do sentences manage to represent?' – the answer might be: 'Don't you know? You certainly see it, when you use them.' For nothing is concealed" (§435).
3. The title of this program series (broadcast by NHK from 21 through 25 September in 1992) is: *Ganbare, Ryugakuse*, or Hang in There, Foreign Students!
4. Sacks (1972a) points out that some "standardized" relationships are expectable between the incumbents (whoever they are) of categories in the special collection he calls R, i.e., the collection of pair relations such as "wife-husband," "friend-friend," etc. I argue that some relationships, even though not so strong as those, are expectable between category members in other collections.

Incidentally, when I use the phrase "normatively expected," I follow N. Luhmann's definition of "normative expectation." Luhmann (1980, 1984, etc.) defines this as expectations which resist learning (even) when breached, as opposed to what he calls "cognitive expectation," defined as expectations subject to learning when breached. However, what I have in mind may be slightly different from what Luhmann must have had in mind when he formulated this definition. He would call cognitive, rather than normative, such an expectation as: Japanese university students do not study hard; because if all Japanese university students one met studied hard it would be reasonable to change one's expectation. However, as Sacks (1966) observes, even this kind of expectation will resist change. In this sense, such expectations should be also normative. In Sacks' term, they are "protected against induction."

5. What topic can be a technical one which the specialist is expected to be more entitled to talk about is not definitely determinable, especially independent of the context. "Nature in Japan" could be such a topic. Following fragment (3), A and B are discussing a Japanese ethnologist, Shinobu Origuchi. Although this topic may be a technical one, they can be heard to talk in such a way as to make the collection "'Japanese' / 'foreigner'" relevant, rather than "'specialist' / 'lay person'." This is made possible by, for one, A's mentioning Origuchi as "famous" (A calls him "*taito*," or great authority). Here, too, it is not relevant whether he is *really* so famous as to be generally known to the Japanese people. This may sound tautological. It should be noted, however, that what I want to do is not to give an explanation in the usual sense, nor to specify what provides conditions

for what. The relevances of a category collection and a normatively expected relationship elaborate each other in H. Garfinkel's (1967: 78) sense.

6. W. W. Sharrock (1974) discusses owning knowledge in an insightful way.
7. The fact that the materials here analyzed are taken from a radio program must be consequential to how the interaction in question unfolds. I will not go into the matter here. Only a couple of words are in order. In news interviews, it is generally observed, the interviewer tends to repeat the points made by the interviewee in a version designed for the audience that is supposed to lack some background knowledge (see Heritage, 1985). It seems that this tendency in news interviews may encourage the interviewer to initiate and/or correct the interviewee's utterances. This general tendency might seem to be able to account for the pattern observed in the materials here. However, it is compatible with another tendency in news interviews which is often pointed out; i.e., the interviewer and the interviewee tend to refrain from starting to speak until the interviewee makes his or her points and the interviewer asks main questions (see Heritage and Greatbatch, 1992; Schegloff, 1988/89, etc.). This also seems to have something to do with the fact that news interviews are designed for an overhearing audience. So, in this respect, the argument in this paper does not have to be modified by the fact that the materials are a radio program.

The interviewer in these materials may be the more obliged to show the understandability of the interviewee's utterances because the interview is also designed for an audience; he may be the more solicitous of the interviewee's understandability in order to sustain the stability of the interview. Moreover, for the same purpose, the interviewer may have an additional task to display the understandability of the interviewee's utterances to an (especially native) audience, even if there is no necessity to show it to the interviewee. In any event, although the tendency I have shown in the text may be enhanced in a radio program, this does not contradict my argument.

8. The concept of "ratified" is elaborated by J. Coulter (1989).

Symbols used in transcripts

- ? indicates upward intonation.
- // indicates point at which following line starts.
- (.) indicates very brief, but observable pause.
- () indicates something said but not transcribable.
- ::: indicates stretching of sound immediately preceding.
- wo- indicates broken word.
- = indicates observable absence of interval between two parts of talk.
- hhh indicates voiced sound of expiration.
- .hh indicates sound of inhalation or voiceless sound of expiration.

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Appendix: The original transcription of materials and the phrase by phrase translation

(1) (9/23/1992 115)

1	A:	Hitotsu one	ukagaitai want to ask	nowa ∞thing	ne, right?>	sono uh
		<i>nihonjinga</i> the Japanese ₂	<i>nihon(.)gode</i> in Japanese ₄	<i>hanashio</i> talk		

- 2 *suru* *tokini* (.) *tokidoki* *osejio* *ittarisuru,*
 ∞do₃ when₁>₂ sometimes compliment ∞say etc.>
- 3 B: *Hai.*
 yes
- 4 A: *oaisoo* *ittarisuru,*
 friendliness ∞say etc.>
- 5 B: *Hai.*
- 6 A: *tteiukoto* *arimasuyo //ne?*
 ∞thing like ∞there is right?>₁
- 7 B: *Hai.*
- 8 A: *Tatoeba,* “*U::n, kondono, e::ja:: yasumini natta ra,*
 for example> next time₂ holiday comes if₁>₂
- Shiri-san, ichido uchini oideyo,”*
 [prop. n.] once my home ∞come to>
- 9 *nanka* *kantanni* *iu,*
 ∞like easily say>₁
- 10 B: *Hai.*
- 11 A: *de,* *yasumini* *natta* *kara* *itte* *miruto* *ne,*
 then holiday₂ comes because₁> go₂ if₁ right?>
- “*o,* *nanishini* *kitanda,”*
 for what have come>₂
- 12 *to(h)//ka(h)* *i(h)wa(h)re(h)ta(h)ri(h)* *toka* *ne. //.hhhh*
 ∞like₂ are told₂>₁ ∞like >
- 13: B: *hhhhhhhhhhhh*
- 13a *Hai.*
- 14 A: *Tsumari,* *itteru* *koto* *to*
 that is> say₂ what₁ and
- 15 B: *Hai*
- 16 A: *hontôno* *kotoga,* *chotto* *chigaunja* *naika*
 true thing kind of different>₃ it seems>₂
- 17 B: *Hai*

- 18 A: *toiukotoo* *yoku* *nihonjinwa*
 ∞thing like₃ often ∞Japanese people₁
- 19 B: *Hai*
- 20 A: *iimasuyo* //ne. *Yoku* *iimasuyo.*
say *right>*₁ *often* *say>*
- 21 B: *Hai*
- 21a *Hai*
- 22 A: *Kore* *dôdesuka.*
 this ∞how>
- 23 B: *Sorewa* *chotto* *gaikokujinno* *baaiwa,* *komarimasu,* //ttoo-
 that's a little foreigner ∞for ∞troublesome>
- 24 A: *Komaru* *desho.*
 troublesome isn't it?>
- 25 B: *Hai,* *machigatte* *iruto,* *chotto,* *soiu* *kotowa* *hontôni*
 wrong is>₄ kind of such₂ thing really
- 26 *itteiruto* *omoimas* *tte,* *minna* *kangaeru//to* *omoimasu.*
 -mean₁> think₂ that₁>₃ everybody consider>₂ think>₁
- 27 A: *Sô* *deshô*
 so isn't it?>
- 28 B: *Hai*
- 29 A: *U::n* (.) *tokoroga* *nihonjin* *dôshi*(.) *desuto* *ne*
 however₂ Japanese among themselves if₁>
- 30 B: *Hai*
- 31 A: “*Sokono* *tokoro* *wa,* *korewa* *osejidana,*” *toka* //ne
 that₂ part as for₁ it's compliment>₂ ∞like
- 32 B: *hâh//â*
- 33 A: “*Korewa,* *ano::* *sôiu* *kotoja* *naindana,*” *tte,*
 this uh such₂ thing not₁> ∞like
- 34 *ko::* *wakarunde//su* *ga*
 this way understand, though>₁
- 35 B: *Hai*

- 36 A: *ano nantonaku ne.*
uh without-nothing-special >
- 37 B: *Hai.*
- 38 A: *Demo, sono nantonakuga komarun*
but that without-nothing-special troublesome
- 39 *desho.*
isn't it?>
- 40 B: *Ha(hhh) so, sôiu tokoroga chotto: un, komarimasu.*
yeah so such part a little ya troublesome>
= *Chotto janakute:: n:://:*
a little ∞not
- 41 A: *u(hhhhh) ta(h)ku(h)san(h) ko(h)ma(h)//ru(h)*
very much troublesome>
- 42 B: *Komarimasu.*
troublesome>
- (2) (9/23/1992: 107)
- 1 A: *Ano:: dôshitemo, watakushi ukagaitai nowa ne,*
well definitely₃ I₂ wanna ask you₄ thing₁ right?>
- 2 B: *Hai.*
yes
- 3 A: *e::: nihongono benkyoo shimasu ne?*
uh Japanese language₂ study ∞do₁ right>
- 4 B: *Hai.*
- 5 A: *soshite::: nihonjinno hitotachi to hanashio*
and then Japanese people to₃ talk₂
shitemimasu (.) //ne?
try to do₁ right?>
- 6 B: *Hai.*
- 7 A: *sôsuruto, e:: dômo itteiru imiga yoku wakara*
then> uh at all>₅ mean₂ meaning₁>₄ well₃ understand
- 8 *nai(.) toiukotoga tokidoki arunja // naidesuka?*
∞not₂ that₁>₃ sometimes the case>₂ wonder if>₁

- 9 B: *Arimasu.*
It's true>
- 10 B: *Arimasu. Ha:: mochiron arimasu.*
well of course >
- 11 A: *Hai.*
- 12 B: *Sorewa, ano: ima: watashi shigotoo shiteiru*
that is> well now₃ I₂ working₄ where(r.)₁>₂
kaisha ni, ima watashi
company ∞in>₁ <now -I
- 12a *ano: shigoto shiteima //su.*
∞well working₂ am doing₁>
- 13 A: *E::, e::.*
yes
- 14 B: *Sono kaisha ni:, kensetsu kikaino kankê*
that -company ∞in <construction -machine -related₃
nandesu //ga,
is₂ and₁>
- 15 A: *Hai.*
- 16 B: ()*se- a, senmonno kotoba ippai detekima//su.*
technical -word ∞many comeout>₁
- 17 A: *senmon yogo //() desu ne:.*
technical term is right?>
- 18 B: *Senmon yogo ()*
- 19 B: *Sorede: wakara nai ko- tokoro //(.) tokidoki*
then understand ∞not₂ part₁> sometimes
detekimasu.
come out>
- 20 A: *M:::.....n,*
- 21 A: *hai.*
- 22 B: *Tokidokidewa naku te, ho//:- ho//:-*
sometimes ∞not but
- 23 A: *Un un*

- 24 B: *un*
- 25 ?: *hhhhhhhh*
- 26 A: *to(h)ki(h)do(h)ki(h) de(h)te(h)ku(h)ru(h)*
sometimes come out>
- 27 B: *Hai.*
- 28 A: *Ma.;* *sorewa,* *shōganai* *desuyo* *ne.*
well for that no way is >
Jun- *junbande,* *sukoshizutsu*
in turn₃ one by one₄
- 29 *oboete//iku* *toiukotoda//to* *omoundesu* *//ga,*
learn₂ that(conj.)₁>₂ think>₁ and
- 30 B: *Hai. Hai. Hai.*
- 31 A: *Hitotsu ukagaitai nowa ne, sono nihonjinga. . .*

(3) (9/24/1992: 379)

- 1 B: . . . *ano,* *tatoeba,* (.) *nihonno-* *nihonno* *rekishi* *de*
uh for example Japanese -history ∞in
- 2 A: *Hai*
- 3 B: *yamawa* *taisetsuna* *koto* *desu* *ne.* *Tai- yama-*
mountain important -thing₂ is₁ >
- 4 A: *Yama.*
- 5 B: *A,*
- 6 A: *Hai.*
- 7 B: *.hh* *Kedo* *.hh* *korewa,* *Tokyo* *de,* *yama* *toka,* *eto,*
but for this [pr.n.] ∞in mountain etc. uh
- 8 *Takao* *san* *ni* () *e//::*
[pr.n.] ∞Mt. [unanalyzable]
- 9 A: *Takao(h)* *san(h)* *shikanai* *//desu* *ne,* *chikakuni*
[pr.n.] ∞Mt.₂ only₁ is in the neighborhood>
- 10 B: *Hai.*

- 11 B: .hh Anmari arimasen node, //()
much₃ there-is-not₂ because₁>
- 12 A: Mn
- 13 B: Kansai de,
- 14 A: Mn
- 15 B: (eto) shizenno midori toka, //sorekara kawa to:o,
uh natural verdure etc. and then river and
yama to//ka
mountain etc.>
- 16 A: M:::n
- 16a So:: //so:
- 17 B: Hai. .hhh Sa- //sakai toiu ()
boundary ∞of
- 18 A: Kyoto dattara, Arashi yama datoka ne://.,
[pr.n.]₂ if it is₁ <[pr.n.] ∞Mt. etc.
ano Katsura gawa datoka,
that [pr.n.] river etc.>
- 19 B: Hai
- 20 A: .hh kawa to yama to shizen to //ippai desumon //ne.
r -& -m -& -nature₃ full of₂ is₁>
- 21 B: .hhhhhhhhh
- 21a Hai. Sorewa, (.).hh sakai, sakai toiu kangaekatao
that is boundary ∞of ∞idea₂
- 22 yoku //wa- waka//rimasu ne.
well₃ understand₁ >
- 23 A: A,
- 23a hai hai hai, a, so:::ka. Fu:::n.
oh I see I see

(4) (9/24/1992: 352)

- 1 A: ... ichiban kokoroni nokotte irunowa nan desuka.
best₃ in mind₄ remain -ing₃ what₁ is₂>

- 24 B: *un*
- 25 ?: *hhhhhhh*
- 26 A: *to(h)ki(h)do(h)ki(h)* *de(h)te(h)ku(h)ru(h)*
sometimes come out>
- 27 B: *Hai.*
- 28 A: *Ma:*, *sorewa*, *shôganai* *desuyo* *ne.*
well₂ for that no way is >
- Jun-* *junbande*, *sukoshizutsu*
in turn₃ one by one₄
- 29 *oboete//iku* *toiukotoda//to* *omoundesu* //ga,
learn₂ that(conj.)₁>₂ think>₁ and
- 30 B: *Hai. Hai. Hai.*
- 31 A: *Hitotsu ukagaitai nowa ne, sono nihonjingu. . .*

(3) (9/24/1992: 379)

- 1 B: . . . *ano*, *tatoeba*, (.) *nihonno-* *nihonno* *rekishi* *de*
uh for example Japanese -history ∞in
- 2 A: *Hai*
- 3 B: *yamawa* *taisetsuna* *koto* *desu* *ne.* *Tai- yama-*
mountain important -thing₂ is₁ >
- 4 A: *Yama.*
- 5 B: *A,*
- 6 A: *Hai.*
- 7 B: *.hh Kedo .hh* *korewa*, *Tokyo* *de*, *yama* *toka*, *eto*,
but for this [pr.n.] ∞in mountain etc. uh
- 8 *Takao* *san* *ni* () *e//:*
[pr.n.] ∞Mt. [unanalyzable]
- 9 A: *Takao(h)* *san(h)* *shikanai* //desu *ne*, *chikakuni*
[pr.n.] ∞Mt.₂ only₁ is in the neighborhood>
- 10 B: *Hai.*

- 11 B: .hh Anmari arimasen node, //()
much₃ there-is-not₂ because₁>
- 12 A: Mn
- 13 B: Kansai de,
- 14 A: Mn
- 15 B: (eto) shizenno midori toka, //sorekara kawa to:o,
uh natural verdure etc. and then river and
yama to//ka
mountain etc.>
- 16 A: M:::n
- 16a So:: //so:
- 17 B: Hai. .hhh Sa- //sakai toiu ()
boundary ∞of
- 18 A: Kyoto dattara, Arashi yama datoka ne://;
[pr.n.]₂ if it is₁ <[pr.n.] ∞Mt. etc.
ano Katsura gawa datoka,
that [pr.n.] river etc.>
- 19 B: Hai
- 20 A: .hh kawa to yama to shizen to //ippai desumon //ne.
r -& -m -& -nature₃ full of₂ is₁>
- 21 B: .hhhhhhhhh
- 21a Hai. Sorewa, (.).hh sakai, sakai toiu kangaekatao
that is boundary ∞of ∞idea₂
- 22 yoku //wa- waka//rimasu ne.
well₃ understand₁ >
- 23 A: A,
- 23a hai hai hai, a, so:::ka. Fu:::n.
oh I see I see

(4) (9/24/1992: 352)

- 1 A: ... ichiban kokoroni nokotte irunowa nan desuka.
best₅ in mind₄ remain -ing₃ what₁ is₂>

- 2 B: .hh Ano Kan(h)sai dato(h) omoimasu.
well> [pr.n.]₂ it is₁>₂ I think>₁
- 3 A: Mn?
- 4 B: Kansaino, a:://:to Kyoto=
=
- 5 A: Kansai
- 6 A: =Kyoto.
- 7 B: Kyototo //Nara:::..... .hhhh
- 8 A: Kyotono dokoga ichiban yokattadesu ka.
in Kyoto what point most₂ was good₁ ?>

(5) (9/23/1992: 100)

- 1 B: ... sono hitotachi to, kaiwa toka, shimashi te,
the -people ooto₃ talk₂ etc. did₁> and

// sorede wakaranai
then> not understand₂
- 2 A: Un, un.
- 3 B: tokoro isshoni oshiete oshiete itadakimashite,
part₁>₃ together teach₂ am given₁>₁
- 4 A: Hai.
- 5 B: sôukotode, m:: dondon mitai, // sukoshizutsu mitai?
this way rapidly oolike gradually
- 6 A: U:::.....n, a::: so::://:....
- 7 B: un, wakat-(.)te kuruyôni narimashita.
understand₃ come to₂ have₁>₂

(7) (9/24/1992: 223)

- 1 A: Sôsuruto, furansude, hajimete, nihonno sono, e,
if so> in France₄ first Japanese uh

shinto nari bukkyo nari, aruiwa bunka nari,
-Shinto -or -Buddhism -or -or -culture

- 2 *.hh* *no:* *kiita* *tokini,* *aruiwa* *shitta* *tokini ne,*
 ∞of₃ heard₂ when₁> or knew₂ when₁>
- 3 B: *Ha//i*
- 4 A: *dô* *omoimaishitaka?*
 how did you feel>
- 5 B: *.hhhhh Ha: .hh i, n:, .hhhh //a*
- 6 A: *Motto kuwashiku*
 more -in detail₂
- 7 B: *A, mot//to-*
- 8 A: *benkyô shitai//na:*
 study ∞want to₁>
- 9 B: *Hai, so: sôsô so//nna kanji desu.*
 so so like that₃ feeling₂ it is₁>
- 10 A: *Fu::::::n, soshite tsuini nihonni kiteshimatta*
 I see> thus finally₄ to Japan₃ have come₂
 to, u(hhhhhhh), so:(h)
 that's why₁>

Note that the syntactical structure of the Japanese language is far different from English such that word orders in the former are often reverse to those in the latter. Numbers indicate in what order words or clauses should be in English. Other symbols used in the phrase by phrase translation are:

- ∞ indicates that the following word should be placed right before the preceding word(s) or clause in English.
- > indicates clausal punctuation.
- <> indicates inserted clause.
- indicates that word order is not influenced by numbering.